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Abstract— We present an architecture for the provision of different IP addresses belong to the same communication, and 
network layer privacy based on the SHIM6 multihoming therefore enables tracking down a given node as it obtains 
protocol. In its basic form, the architecture prevents on-path connectivity through different points of the Internet.  
eavesdroppers from using SHIM6 network layer information to 
correlate packets that belong to the same communication but use In this paper we analyze the privacy concerns raised by the 
different locators. To achieve this, several extensions to the exchange of information performed to maintain SHIM6 
SHIM6 protocol and to the HBA (Hash Based Addresses) communications. In the Basic Privacy mode, the architecture 
addressing model are defined. On its full-featured mode of allows conceals sensible information by encrypting parts of the 
operation, hosts can vary dynamically the addresses of the SHIM6 protocol exchange using the secret obtained through 
packets of on-going communications. Single-homed hosts can Diffie-Hellman. Additionally, the SHIM6-specific identity 
adopt the SHIM6 protocol with the privacy enhancements to tokens carried in the data packets to allow the SHIM6 layer to 
benefit from this protection against information collectors. recover the original identifiers are changed for each different 
path, so that its value is no longer valid for obtaining the 
Keywords: HBA, IPv6, privacy, SHIM6 multiple IP addresses of a multihomed node, or to gather the 
pieces of a communication flow when different addresses are 
I. INTRODUCTION used. 
is a growing concern in today’s Internet. This is due to the Furthermore we can take advantage of the facilities 
increasing number of abuses resulting from the malicious use provided by the SHIM6 multihoming protocol to define an 
of personal data acquired through Internet. For example, an architecture that increases the protection against network layer 
eavesdropper can track web accesses to disclosure user’s privacy attacks. This additional protection can be provided if 
interests; or can inspect email exchanges to acquire sensitive the variation over time of the network tokens used by on-going 
personal information. Although an expensive infrastructure is communications is allowed. In this case, the number of packets 
required to correlate IP packets captured in an arbitrary node of that can be associated to the same communication by matching 
the Internet at the application layer, privacy can be network-level identifiers can be reduced at will. This Full-
compromised by much simpler procedures. For example, the Featured Privacy mode is not only profitable for multi-homed 
inspection of Internet traffic to obtain characteristics of a given nodes but also for single-homed hosts that may adopt the 
communication such as duration, number of bytes transferred, SHIM6 protocol with the privacy enhancements just to obtain 
or parties involved, can provide useful information to a protection from address-based correlation. 
harvester without requiring complex processing. This 
information can be obtained through proper correlation of In the Full-Featured Privacy mode, the generation and 
identity tokens such as transport layer ports, IP addresses, or management of the different IPv6 addresses and SHIM6-
link layer addresses in locations close to the communicating specific identity tokens relies on pseudorandom sequences that 
nodes. Transport layer information and above can be encrypted are only known by the communicating parties. The 
by means of IPSec, but even if this costly mechanism is used, synchronization that is required among the peers is performed 
network layer identifiers such as IP addresses still provide without explicit signaling. The management of the 
means to disclose end-point identities and to delimit pseudorandom sequences of network identity tokens requires 
communication flows.  the allocation of many tokens (e.g. many IPv6 addresses) per 
communication. As the number of tokens grows, so does the 
Additional privacy concerns are raised by the emergence of probability of having an undesirable collision with existent 
new protocols enabling mobility (e.g. MIPv6), or multihoming tokens. To assess the validity of the architecture when applied 
(e.g. SHIM6 [1], currently under development by the IETF). In to practical scenarios, a quantitative analysis of the collision of 
both cases, the aim is to preserve an established identifiers is performed.  
communication when a node changes its network attachment 
point, i.e. changes the IP address at which it is reachable. The It should be noted that our solution protects from passive 
protocol information exchanged among the communicating eavesdroppers, but does not provide protection against a node 
parties allows an eavesdropper to determine that packets using that initiates or actively intercepts a communication. Therefore, 
This work has been supported by the OPTINET6 project TIC-2003-
09042-C03-01 and by the IMPROVISA project TSI2005-07384-C03-02. 
1-4244-0353-7/07/$25.00 ©2007 IEEE 
This full text paper was peer reviewed at the direction of IEEE Communications Society subject matter experts for publication in the ICC 2007 proceedings. 
1509
Authorized licensed use limited to: IEEE Xplore. Downloaded on November 14, 2008 at 10:51 from IEEE Xplore.  Restrictions apply.
an attacker could initiate a communication to obtain a set of 
addresses assigned to a node, gathering different prefixes to 
which the node is attached. However, with the Full-Featured 
Privacy mode, communications are still protected, because the 
network tokens used are independent from the tokens of any 
other communication. 
The rest of the paper is structured as follows: First the 
SHIM6 architecture is described, addressing both the protocol 
and the security model. Next, a privacy analysis to identify the 
vulnerabilities raised by SHIM6 is presented. The privacy 
architecture that addresses the vulnerabilities and provides new 
functionality by extending the protocol is then proposed. After 
the discussion of the related work and the conclusions, an 
analysis of the probability of collision of network identity 
tokens for the Full-Featured Privacy mode is found in the 
Appendix. 
II. SHIM6 OVERVIEW 
In order to preserve the scalability of the global routing 
system, the IPv6 community is limiting the assignment of 
Provider Independent address blocks to the subscribers of the 
ISPs, and advocating in that case the adoption of Provider 
Aggregatable addressing. Such approach forces multihomed 
sites, i.e. sites connecting to the Internet through multiple 
providers, to obtain one Provider Aggregatable prefix from 
each of their provider’s address blocks. Moreover, since ISPs 
only announce their own prefix block into the global routing 
system, a multihomed host is reachable at a given address only 
through the corresponding ISP. Consequently, in order to be 
reachable through all the available ISPs, a host within the 
multihomed site needs to configure as many addresses as 
prefixes are available in the site.  
The preservation of an establish communication when an 
outage occurs requires to re-home the communication to the 
address of an alternative ISP. This change has to be performed 
transparently with respect to the transport layer, since this layer 
identifies the endpoints of a communication by the IP 
addresses of the nodes involved. To manage this change, 
SHIM6 [1], a multihoming mechanism located within the IP 
layer, is proposed. The SHIM6 layer performs a mapping 
between the identifier presented to the upper layers and the 
locator actually used to exchange packets on the wire, so 
different locators could be used to enforce different paths for 
the communication. To achieve this, two multihomed hosts 
have to establish a SHIM6 context state in both end-points of 
the communication so that they can exchange the information 
about alternative locators using the SHIM6 protocol. 
Next we describe the security mechanisms used to protect 
the SHIM6 architecture, and the architecture of the actual 
SHIM6 protocol. 
A. SHIM6 Security 
The ability of the multihoming protocol to associate several 
locators to a given identifier raises the concern on attacks in 
which a network identity is redirected to a non-legitimate 
locator. To protect from redirection attacks when the SHIM6 
protocol is used, the use of Hash Based Addresses (HBA) [2] is 
proposed. HBA are a new type of global IPv6 addresses that 
incorporate into the interface identifier a cryptographic one-
way hash of the prefix-set available in the multihomed host. 
The result is that the binding between all the addresses of a 
multihomed host is encoded within the addresses themselves, 
providing hijacking protection. In a general multihoming 
scenario, a multihomed host X attached to a link where N 64-
bit prefixes are available (PX1::/64, PX2::/64,…, PXN::/64) 
generates the interface identifier (II) of each of its addresses as 
a 64-bit hash of the prefix set available in the link and a 
random nonce (RN): 
IIJ = hash|64 (PXJ::/64, PX1::/64,…, PXJ-1::/64, PXJ+1::/64, 
… PXN::/64, RN) 
Finally, the addresses that form the HBA set result from the 
concatenation of each prefix with its corresponding interface 
identifier. Note that the interface identifiers are different for 
each address because the prefixes are placed in different order 
prior to each hash computation. Any node communicating with 
a multihomed one can verify through a simple hash calculation 
that the alternative addresses proposed for diverting the 
communication are bound to the initial address. 
B. SHIM6 Protocol 
The SHIM6 protocol [1] creates and manages the SHIM6 
context associated with the communication between two nodes, 
and provides the means to preserve the established 
communication when data packets using different locators are 
exchanged. We next describe the context establishment and 
data packet exchange functions of the SHIM6 protocol. 
Consider that one of the nodes involved in a 
communication decides to create a SHIM6 context in order to 
benefit from the multihoming capabilities. We refer to the party 
that initiates the SHIM6 context creation process as the 
initiator and to the other communicating party as the 
responder. We suppose that at least one of the parties is 
multihomed, in this example the initiator, and its multiple 
addresses have been generated as an HBA set associated with 
the multiple prefixes available. The initiator requests the 
creation of a SHIM6 context associated with a pair of 
identifiers issuing a message named I1. Upon the reception of 
this message, the responder does not create any state, in order 
to protect against some forms of Denial-of-Service attacks, but 
it simply replies with a R1 message. Then, the initiator sends an 
I2 message that contains the following information relevant for 
us: 
- the original pair of identifiers,  
- the initiator’s context tag, unique for each communication 
of the initiator, used to identify the data packets that belong to 
the same communication but contain alternative locators to the 
original ones, as it is detailed in the next section  
- the locator set available at the initiator, and 
- the context required to validate the locators at the receiver, 
e.g. the random nonce required for the HBA generation. 
Upon the reception of the I2 message, the responder 
verifies that the initiator’s identifier is included in the HBA set 
derived from the received information. If this verification is 
successful, the responder creates the SHIM6 context, and 
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replies with a R2 message, in which it includes its own context 
tag, locator set and context for address validation. 
The SHIM6 layer performs the translation between the 
identifiers and the locators of the packets send to and received 
from the wire. Since the identifier is used as a locator until a 
change occurs, some means to properly identify the packets 
that need to be translated has to be provided. A context tag 
(CT) is carried in a SHIM6 Extension Header included in the 
packets that carry addresses other than the identifiers. The CT 
is uniquely associated to a particular pair of source and 
destination identifiers. Note that when a packet is sent from the 
responder to the initiator, the CT set by the initiator is the one 
that must be included in the packet. Since all the CTs carried in 
the packets received in the initiator, possibly belonging to 
different communications, are assigned by the initiator itself, it 
is easy to assure its uniqueness. 
III. SHIM6 PRIVACY ANALYSIS 
In this section we analyze the privacy implications of the 
use of the SHIM6 protocol. The scenario considered consists in 
two communicating nodes. At least one of them has multiple 
addresses, so the SHIM6 protocol is used to enable the 
transparent variation of the addresses used for exchanging data 
packets. In this scenario, we consider an information harvester 
H that is placed along the communication path between the two 
nodes. Depending on the particular location of H, it may be 
only able to see the packets exchanged using a subset of the 
addresses available, since different addresses are in general 
associated to different paths. In the worst case, H is able to see 
all the packets involved in the communication. In this scenario, 
H can easily extract useful information about the peers 
involved in the communication such as number of packets, 
duration, etc. In addition, H is able to determine some of the 
multiple addresses that belong to the same host, if he manages 
to determine part of the address set available for the considered 
host. We next analyze which information can be extracted by H 
from the inspection of the SHIM6 protocol. 
We consider the case where H is able to inspect the SHIM6 
context establishment exchange. During this phase, the peers 
exchange in clear the identifier pair and the locator set 
available for each host. If H obtains such information, it can 
infer that all the addresses contained in each locator set belong 
to a single host and it can track down its communications, even 
if the host uses different locators. In addition, during the 
SHIM6 context establishment handshake, the CTs for each 
direction of the communication are exchanged. These tags will 
be included later in data packets carrying alternative locators. 
An attacker can infer that multiple data packets with different 
addresses, but carrying the same CT, belong to a given 
communication, hence discovering that multiple addresses 
belong to the same host. Note that the CT provides means to 
correlate packets using different locators even if the context 
establishment handshake was not captured. 
IV. SHIM6 PRIVACY ARCHITECTURE 
The architecture proposed consists in a set of extensions to 
the SHIM6 protocol that can be combined to operate in two 
different privacy protection modes. In the Basic Privacy mode, 
a node located along the path will not be able neither to 
determine the HBA address sets of the multihomed nodes, nor 
to correlate different packets exchanged through alternative 
paths. To achieve this, we conceal the relevant information 
exchanged in the SHIM6 protocol (locator sets, address 
validation parameters, and context tags), and we enforce the 
use of different CTs for packets that carry different addresses 
but belong to the same communication. 
In the Full-Featured Privacy mode, besides the protection 
of the SHIM6 exchange, the dynamic variation of locators and 
CTs for an on-going communication is enabled. Sequences of 
interface identifiers and CTs are defined, so that they can be 
changed dynamically for a given path. If each variation of the 
interface identifiers and the CT is combined with a change of 
the prefix pair used (avoiding previously used <local prefix, 
remote prefix> pairs), the difficulty in using network tokens for 
the correlation of chunks of transferred data is substantially 
increased. Moreover, this mode can be used to provide some 
kind of privacy even for a single-homed host, since it can vary 
its addresses over time for an on-going communication 
although the transmission path remained unchanged. 
It is worth to note that the variation over time of the CTs or 
addresses may result in collisions in a host, so a mechanism to 
handle gracefully these collisions should be provided. A CT 
collision occurs when a host allocates the same CT for two 
communications, defeating the SHIM6 flow identification 
capacity. An address collision occurs when the dynamic 
address generation process results in an address that is already 
in use by another node in the segment in which it is defined, 
and it may result in the disruption of the communication. 
We next detail the mechanisms common to both privacy 
modes, namely a modification in the SHIM6 context 
establishment phase to encrypt the sensible information carried 
in the SHIM6 protocol with a secret agreed through a Diffie-
Hellman exchange, the negotiation of the use of privacy 
facilities for a communication, and a simple negotiation of the 
privacy mode. Then we briefly address how the Basic Privacy 
mode provides different CTs for each prefix assigned to the 
node. We finish with the description of the mechanisms 
introduced by the Full-Featured Privacy mode to dynamically 
vary addresses and CTs. 
A. SHIM6 Protocol Exchange Extensions 
In order to conceal the information exchanged in the 
SHIM6 context establishment exchange, we propose the use of 
the Diffie-Hellman key agreement to generate a shared secret, 
and the use of this shared secret to encrypt the information that 
must remain private. The Diffie-Hellman key agreement is 
included as an option in messages R1 and I2, so that after the 
reception of R1, the initiator can create the shared secret and 
conceal the private information (the locator set, address 
validation parameters, and the parameters required for the 
generation of the sequences of CTs and addresses, as shown 
below) included in the I2 packet. Analogously, R2 can be used 
by the responder to include its corresponding information. 
The negotiation for the extended privacy facilities occurs as 
follows: The request for privacy can be raised by either the 
initiator or by the responder. The initiator can include a Privacy 
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Request option in the I1 message to notify the responder its 
desire to obtain privacy support for the communication for 
which the SHIM6 context is being created. Either as a response 
to this request, or as a consequence of the responder’s own 
will, the responder can initiate the Diffie-Hellman exchange at 
message R1. If either the responder or the initiator does not 
exchange the cryptographic material required to generate the 
Diffie-Hellman key, the communication continues without 
privacy support. Since unknown SHIM6 options are silently 
discarded, a communication with a node that does not 
implement the privacy extensions seamlessly fall back to the 
standard SHIM6 protocol exchange. 
To negotiate the Privacy mode used for a communication, a 
Privacy Mode option is defined with two possible values 
corresponding to the Basic and to the Full-Featured Privacy 
modes. This option can be included in both I2 and R2 messages 
to allow each peer to express the configuration desired. The 
resulting configuration is the Basic Privacy mode unless both 
nodes request the Full-Featured Privacy mode. 
B. Context Tag Management for Basic Privacy Mode 
In the Basic Privacy mode, locators and CTs are stable for 
the duration of the communication. However, a modification to 
the current SHIM6 specification is required in order to enforce 
the use of different CTs per possible locator pair of the 
communication, so an eavesdropper could no longer use the 
CTs to correlate information. Both parties must agree in the 
CTs to be used in order to be able to recover the original 
identifiers.  
The CT generation process is as follows: Both node X 
(with prefixes PX1, PX2, …, PXN) and node Y (with prefixes 
PY1, PY2, …, PYM) generate randomly a seed that is unique for 
the communication, respectively seedX and seedY. The CT at 
node X, for a given communication between node X and Y,  
associated to the locator pair <PXJ , PYK> (i.e. the CT that 
would be included in data packets sent from locator PYK to 
locator PXJ), is computed as: 
CT (X) J K= hash|47 (PXJ, K, seedX) 
Consequently, its corresponding CT at node Y is 
CT (Y) K J= hash|47 (PYK, J, seedY) 
Both nodes can compute all the CTs at X and at Y. Since 
the prefixes are encrypted for its transmission in the SHIM6 
context establishment exchange, an eavesdropper cannot 
determine the CTs used in the communication. 
A collision may occur in each node if any of the local CTs 
generated for this communication has been previously 
allocated for any other SHIM6 communication. To avoid a 
collision, the node should check that there are no coincidences 
between the CTs candidate to be allocated and the CTs of prior 
active communications. If a coincidence occurs, new seeds are 
generated and tested until no collision is found. If we compute 
the probability in a similar way to the one presented in the 
Appendix, for a restrictive case in which the nodes hold 100 
private communications, and 100 prefixes each, the probability 
of collision is still below 7.1·10-5. 
In order to avoid the need for additional messages the seeds 
should be transmitted in messages I2 and R2 of the SHIM6 
context establishment exchange. However, the initiator does 
not know neither the locator set of the receiver nor the number 
of prefixes of the receiver until R2 is received. It can test a seed 
assigning to the number of prefixes of the receiver a number 
large enough so that the real number would not exceed it. After 
receiving the R2 message, it can discard the extra CTs. If the 
number of prefixes received in R2 from the remote node would 
be larger than the number allocated for the collision test, new 
checks are performed for the untested CTs. If the test fails, new 
seeds are obtained until successfully checked for the real 
number of prefixes of the receiver, and a SHIM6 Update 
Request message is sent by the initiator. 
C. Dynamic Management of Locators and Context Tags for 
the Full-Featured Privacy Mode 
In this section we propose the use of keyed pseudorandom 
sequences for the generation of the addresses and CTs, so that 
both nodes, and only these nodes, can generate the next values 
that are to be used when a variation occurs.  
First of all we want to state that all tokens must change 
jointly when a variation is raised, because otherwise any 
unchanged token could be used by an attacker to defeat the 
protection. Therefore after a privacy instance p defined by  
<locator(X)p, CT(X)p, locator(Y)p, CT(Y)p>,  
a new privacy instance p+1 with  
<locator(X)p+1, CT(X)p+1, locator(Y)p+1, CT(Y)p+1>  
is used. 
The pseudorandom sequences are built upon a secret seed 
defined by each node, and upon a shared privacy instance 
index. The seed is encrypted with the key generated by the 
Diffie-Hellman exchange, and conveyed to the correspondent 
peer in messages I2 and R2. The privacy instance index is 
initialized to 0 in both nodes, and it is increased by 1 each time 
a new set of local and remote addresses and CTs are selected.  
To enable the dynamic generation of addresses, we define a 
new Privacy Extension that is appended to the HBA structure, 
so that it is included in the input to the hash that generates the 
interface identifier for each address. When the privacy instance 
index is 0, i.e. before any change in the locators occurs, the 
valid locators are the ones obtained from the HBA without 
including the Privacy Extension. For privacy instance indexes 
above 0, the interface identifiers in the private context p 
corresponding to prefix PXJ are computed as follows: 
IIJp = hash|64 (PXJ::/64,PX1::/64,…,PXJ-
1::/64,PXJ+1::/64,…,PXN::/64, RN, seedX, p) 
In the Full-Featured Privacy mode, CTs are not required to 
be different for each pair of locators in the same privacy 
instance index, since only one pair of locators will be used for a 
given privacy instance index. Therefore, CTs can be computed 
as:  
CT(X) p = hash|47 (seedX, p) 
The CT at node X is  
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CT(Y) p = hash|47 (seedY, p) 
The avoidance of collisions in the Full-Featured Privacy 
mode is based on the a priori reservation of a collision-free set 
of sequential privacy instances (including Interface Identifiers 
and CTs) for each private communication. A node that may 
initiate or receive a communication with SHIM6 privacy 
generates a local seed and defines a number of consecutive 
instances for which collisions should be avoided. Then, the 
node generates the local CTs for each of the contexts to be 
specified and checks for a CT collision. If no collision occurs, 
then all the local addresses corresponding to the contexts 
specified are generated, and configured in its corresponding 
interfaces, so that the IPv6 Duplicate Address Detection 
procedure is started for each one to check for address 
collisions. The Duplicate Address Detection procedure can be 
performed in parallel for all the candidate addresses, so that the 
delay introduced, a default value of 1 second, did not depend 
on the number of addresses. Note that the same interface 
identifier must be unique only in the segment to which it is 
assigned. If no duplicate addresses are found, then the set of 
instances are valid for its use in the near future. If either a CT 
or address collision is detected, an alternative local seed is 
generated and the process is restarted. The probability of any 
collision, which is the probability of being forced to repeat the 
privacy instance allocation, is very low, less than 10-5 even for 
scenarios with intensive use of privacy facilities, as it is shown 
in the Appendix.  
The number of consecutive instances allocated for the 
communication by each host is exchanged in I2 and R2 of the 
SHIM6 context establishment phase. Each host can select a 
different number of consecutive collision-free instances, and 
the minimum value is selected by the peers. The instances can 
be used in a round robin fashion, although it is highly desirable 
to avoid the use of the same instance twice.  
Once the communication is established, the synchronization 
is coordinated as follows: a given privacy instance is used until 
one of the communicating peers decides to change it, either 
because of the expiration of a timer, that could be managed by 
the operating system, or due to an instance change requested by 
an application. When a node receives a packet with different 
addresses and local CT, it changes the current instance to the 
one corresponding to the received packet. Note that this 
procedure does not require any explicit signaling that could 
provide hints to malicious information collectors. 
V. RELATED WORK 
RFC3041 [3] proposes the generation of different interface 
identifiers for IPv6 address in order to provide protection 
against the correlation of different communications. However, 
it does not provide any means to use different addresses for the 
same communication, and it does not consider the problems 
raised by the use of multihoming. 
The use of pseudo random sequences as a privacy 
enhancement for network and transport layers is discussed in 
[4], from which some concepts of this paper have been drawn, 
although they do not consider multihoming neither as a 
problem (if the exchange protocol is not properly adapted) nor 
as an enabler for privacy protection.  
The MIPv6 protocol shares similar privacy concerns with 
multihoming. In the Route Optimization mode, the Home 
Address (HoA) is carried on each data packet so it can be used 
to trace different locations of a Mobile Node. In [5] the HoA is 
substituted by a Privacy Label that is generated pseudo 
randomly from information exchanged using the protected path 
through the Home Agent. Although it is stated that the privacy 
label could vary even in each packet, there is no description on 
how this could be synchronized, the effect of packet loss in the 
sequencing, how collisions are treated, as it is discussed here.  
Other proposals rely on middleboxes to provide privacy. 
Application layer proxies are used to encrypt the data 
transferred through the Onion Routing overlay network [6]. 
Castellucia et al. [7] propose an authorization model based on 
cryptographic identifiers to establish IPsec tunnels between 
specific security gateways. In both cases, network layer tokens 
are protected only in the path between intermediate nodes, 
protection depends on confidence on third parties, and costly 
infrastructure is required. 
As mentioned before, our solution does not provide 
protection against an eavesdropper that initiates or actively 
intercepts a communication. In the BLIND framework [8], the 
end-point identifier is based on asymmetric cryptography and 
completely decoupled from the IP locators. A Diffie-Hellman 
key exchange protocol protects the identifier even from active 
attackers. However, this holds for a limited scenario, since a 
priori knowledge of the identifiers of the participants is 
required, while the identifiers must not be kwon by the 
attackers. In the SHIM6 multihoming architecture, the 
identifiers are also valid locators to allow easy deployment 
when IP addresses are passed as referrals among applications. 
VI. CONCLUSIONS 
We have presented a SHIM6-based architecture for the 
provision of network layer privacy for multihomed hosts that 
can be also be used to provide privacy to single-homed hosts. 
The architecture defines some extensions to the SHIM6 
protocol and to the HBA address generation process that allow 
the provision of different levels of privacy. In the Basic Privacy 
mode, a multihomed host conceals the information exchanged 
by the SHIM6 protocol by means of a Diffie-Hellman key 
agreement option, and the data packets use different context 
tags for each path. If the dynamic variation of network tokens 
is desired, the Full-Featured Privacy mode allows the 
management of a sequence of context tags and interface 
identifiers that change over time for an on-going 
communication, without explicit signaling. A single-homed 
node can take advantage of the possibility of using addresses 
that change over time even if the communication path is not 
changed. In this case, several different prefixes should be 
assigned to each segment if the address space is large enough 
to difficult address correlation. 
This architecture introduces some costs compared to the 
standard SHIM6 one. First, new context state is required at the 
communicating peers: more context tags and addresses per 
prefix, seeds, privacy instance index, and number of instances 
allocated. Computing costs are incurred for collision checks, 
and eventually, with a very low probability, for obtaining new 
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seeds in case of collision. Another cost component is derived 
from the CPU time required for the Diffie-Hellman key 
agreement and the encryption of the relevant privacy 
parameters. However, it should be highlighted that no burden is 
placed on data packets. Future work, quantitative analysis of 
the performance impact should be conducted. 
The resulting architecture provides by itself a certain degree 
of privacy, since it allows a node to use different addresses 
during the lifetime of a communication making it harder to 
track an ongoing communication. However, in order to achieve 
full privacy protection, the architecture should be combined 
with additional mechanisms to conceal higher layer 
information. It is also required to conceal lower layer 
information if the eavesdropper shares the link layer with one 
of the communication peers. For future work, protection to 
IPsec parameters should be provided by the SHIM6 privacy 
architecture, so that identity tokens such as the SPI index could 
not be used for packet correlation. 
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APPENDIX: PRIVACY INSTANCE COLLISION PROBABILITY IN 
THE FULL-FEATURED PRIVACY MODE 
The solution for this problem is a variation of the well 
known “birthday problem”. Suppose an existing group of j 
numbers for which there are no collisions, and k numbers are 
added to the group. The k added numbers are the result of an 
integer random variable, with uniform distribution between 1 
and n. Then, the number of ways we can choose k values out of 
n, without generating duplicates in the j+k numbers of the new 
group is (n-j) · (n-j-1) · … ·(n-j-k+1). 
On the other hand, the number of possibilities for choosing 
k elements out of n without the restriction of not having any 
duplicates is nk. Therefore, the probability of having at least a 
collision when we select k elements out of n and we add them 
to a group with j elements is 
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Performing simple computations in (1) we obtain 
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Since [ ]
n
k
n
iki 11,...,2,1 −≤⇒−∈∀ , and k < n, we can bound 
P(n,j,k) to avoid the computation of factorial numbers 
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To particularize the formula to the Full-Featured Operation 
Mode, we define the following parameters: 
C – Number of communications per node using the privacy 
extensions 
W – Privacy window size per communication context 
N – Number of nodes per IPv6 segment 
X – Number of prefixes per node 
Another data are the size of the CT space, 247, and the 
number of different HBA interface identifiers in a segment, 259 
(five bits of the interface identifier are reserved for other uses, 
although we have omitted the details for the sake of clarity).  
Combining the probabilities of CT collision in the node, 
and address collision on each prefix allocated to the node, we 
can obtain an upper bound for the probability of a privacy 
instance collision (PPIC): 
 [ ][ ]XPIC CWNCWBWCWBP )·,··,2(1·),·,2(11 5947 −−−≤  (4) 
For C=10, W=100, N=100, X=10, the probability of 
collision is less than 2.5·10-9. Even for intensive use of the 
privacy facilities, in which each segment is shared among a 
large number of systems (increasing the possibility of an 
address collision), C=100, W=1000, N=1000, X=10, the 
probability of collision is less than 1.8·10-5.
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